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ABSTRAK
Penelitian ini menguji mengenai mekanisme kesediaan manajer dalam bertindak sesuai dengan kepentingan
perusahaan. Khususnya, penelitian ini menguji peran skema insentif untuk mengurangi senjangan anggaran
unit bisnis. Pilot study dilakukan pada 34 responden yang mewakili sampel penelitian ini untuk menjamin
kelayakan dan kejelasan kuesioner dan komentar yang diperoleh dari mereka. Dengan menggunakan Moderated
Structural Equation Modeling, penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa tingkat diversifikasi perusahaan tidak
mampu mengontrol keberadaan senjangan anggaran. Penelitian ini juga menunjukkan bahwa hubungan
signifikan antara diversifikasi dan senjangan anggaran dimoderasi oleh orientasi nilai perusahaan terhadap
inovasi. Hasil penelitian juga mengungkapkan bahwa, dari tiga skema insentif, corporate-based incentive
mampu mengurangi keberadaan senjangan anggaran. Penelitian ini menyarankan agar peneliti lain yang
tertarik di bidang ini untuk menggunakan pengukuran insentif yang lain seperti insentif berbasis berbasis
kelompok dibandingkan dengan insentif berbasis turnamen. Penelitian ini dapat disimpulkan bahwa perspektif
keagenan mungkin tidak sesuai untuk menjelaskan keberadaan senjangan anggaran di unit bisnis ketika
pengaruh yang tidak signifikan ditemukan pada hubungan antara skema insentif terhadap senjangan anggaran.
Kata kunci: senjangan anggaran, skema insentif, diversifikasi, inovasi
ABSTRACT
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the management’s willingness to act in the best
interest of the top corporate. Particularly, this study examines the role of incentive schemes to reduce
the presence of budgetary slack in the business units budget. Pilot study was conducted to 34
respondents that represented the sample of this study to ensure the feasibility and clarity of
questionnaires and collected comments from them. Using Moderated Structural Equation Modeling,
this study found that diversified firms can not control the presence of budgetary slack. Moreover, this
study found that the significance relationship between diversification and budgetary slack was
moderated by the firms’ value orientation towards innovation. The results also revealed that, out of
three incentive schemes, only corporate-based incentive was able to reduce the presence of budgetary
slack. This paper suggest interested researcher to use other measures of incentives such as group-
based versus tournament-based incentive. This study can be concluded that agency perspectives may
no longer be suitable to explain the presence of budgetary slack in their business units as the
nonsignificant effect found on the relationship between incentive schemes on budgetary slack.
Keywords: budgetary slack, incentive schemes, diversification, innovation
INTRODUCTION
Slack has been an important topic in
management accounting domains that had
been consensually defined as the intentional
biasing of budgetary targets. However, the
opposing streams of literature have led
some confusion among the scholars and
inconclusive findings that rarely provide
some meaningful contributions to the
theory. For example, taking a positive view,
accounting “behaviorists” have suggested
the use of idle resources that may act as a
buffer from environmental pressures
(Martinez and Artz, 2006; Voss et al. 2008),
or as a shock absorber (Hendrick 2006;
Mellahi and Wilkinsion, 2010), and as a
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cushion to engage in risk taking/innovative
behavior (Herold et al., 2006; Love &
Nohria, 2005). These “idle resources” are,
therefore, important in providing organi-
zations capabilities to act in ways that are
not possible for other organizations poorer
in resources (Kim et al. 2008). Natividad
(2012) and George (2005) maintained that
the presence of slack can be used as an
enactment of strategies. Lawson (2001)
insisted that attempts to reduce slack may
be ill-advised; and in a more provoking
position, Martinez and Artz (2006) even
argued that “it is not possible for a firm to
survive long without the presence of
resources above and beyond its immediate
needs”.
On the other hand, economists such as
Jensen and Meckling (1986) argued that
slack diminishes incentives to innovate and
promotes undisciplined investment in R&D
activities that rarely yield economic benefits
and reflects the self-serving interest of mana
gers. Earliest theorists have also documen-
ted that slack may induce the presence of
sub-optimal systems, processes, and struc-
tures that reduce a firm’s aggressive expl
rations of new responses (e.g. innovation,
creativity).  In fact, as been noted by Cheng
and Kesner (1997), the term slack itself
conjures up a host of negative perceptions.
Current study argues that the justi-
fication for slack creation can be understood
clearly by figuring out the determinants and
reasons for creating such slack. Inspired by
the works of Merchant and Stede (2007) and
Stede (2000, 2001), this study emphasizes the
roles of diversification strategy and the
extent of incentive schemes on the slack
creation in the business units’ budget.
Diversification strategy has been
argued to have a positive effect on the
budgetary slack particularly due to its
controlling and monitoring issues. Earlier
researches (i.e. Yen and Andre, 2007) have
also provided some reasonable arguments
for negative correlations between diversifi-
cation and control. They mainly implicitly
implied that the higher the business units
may  put the corporate parent at a disadva
tage position to uncover slack. Two alter-
natives are possible for a way out of this
control issues. First, the corporate parent
may engage in daily monitoring activities.
Second, the corporate can tighten the
administrative system such as use of
accounting information for performance
evaluation to reduce slack. The later is
deemed to be more beneficial however, but
again, prior empirical results were incon-
clusive (Merchant et al., 2003).
In order to provide a way out of this
debate, current study argues that the roles of
value should be plays some important roles
in the inconsistent findings. The design and
development of accounting systems and
controls may not be well implemented if not
in-line with the firms’ values. Firms’ orien-
tation towards innovation may affect the
relationship between diversification and
budgetary slack. Herold et al. (2006) have
also agreed that slack is an important source
of funding for innovation. Therefore, it can
be expected that highly innovative mana-
gers coupled with highly diversified busi-
ness units may have higher slack in their
business units budget.
This study contributes to the mana-
gement accounting literature in several
ways. First, although the impact of organi-
zational structure to slack creation had been
widely examined, but how the innovation
value affects such a relationship is left
unexplored. Second, this study tested the
impact of diversification on each incentive
schemes that lead to budgetary slack inde-
pendently that, based on the literature
review, never been conducted previously.
 The main objective of this research is to
examine in detail the effect of diversification
on manager’s tendency in biasing his/her
ability to attain the budget target directly/
indirectly through incentive schemes. It also
tests the effect of Firms’ value orientation
towards innovation on the relationship bet-
ween diversification and budgetary slack on
different schemes of incentive systems.
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 The next section of this paper draws on
previous literature to develop the theoretical
framework and hypotheses development for
this study. Section 3 presents the sample, the
data, and the measures of the variables.
Section 4 discusses in detail the statistical
methods used and their underlying assump-
tions. The following section presents the
results and discusses the findings. Finally,
conclusions, limitations and directions for
future research are provided in section 6.
THEORETICAL REVIEW
Defining Budgetary Slack
Earlier work defined budgetary slack as
the result of management’s consciousness
and intentional behavior during the budge-
tary process as an outcome of rigid budge-
tary evaluation (Schiff and Lewin, 1968).
Recently, Douglas et al. (2007) defined
budgetary slack as the variances of actual
spending and budgeted spending and the
difference between the expected and actual
performance. On the other hand, Dunk
(1993) referred the slack as the intentional
behavior of managers to make the budget
easier to attain by underestimating the expec
ted revenues and overestimating the expec-
ted costs. Douglas and Wier (2000) claimed
that budgetary biasing behavior is the
difference between planned performance
target and real performance capabilities.
Leavin et al. (1995) insisted that budgetary
slack exist due to the results of management
conscious and intentional behavior during
the budgetary process.
Waller (1988) argued that slack can be
conceptualized as the difference between an
individual’s best estimate of performance
and the standard chosen when participating
in standard selection. Merchant (1985) on
the other hand defined budgetary slack as
the difference between real and budgeted
amount embedded in the budgeting process.
Similarly, Yuen (2004, 2006) conceptualized
budgetary slack as the building of excess
resources in a budget or understating pro-
ductive capability and thus will make the
budget easier to attain.
For this study, budgetary slack is
conceptualized as the extent of built idle
resources during budgeting process by
understimating revenue and overstating
expenses in order to make the budget tar-
gets easier to achieve. This conceptualization
may create some meaningful relationships
between financial and budgetary slack,
particularly regarding the use of buffer in
order to hedge against unforeseen conti-
ngencies.
Diversification
Corporate diversification is defined as
the extent to which an organization is
enrolling at several businesses simulta-
neously. Corporate diversification can be
decomposed into two specific types: related
and unrelated diversification. The two dif-
fers based on how the resource exploitation
is conducted. Related diversification is defi-
ned as the extent of exploitation of operati-
onal inter-relationship between business
units (Stede, 2001). Firms with unrelated
diversification, on the other hand, do not
share core competencies between business
units. Rather, the connection between busi-
ness units is solely based on financial
connections attached on the consolidated
financial report.
It is still confusing how diversification
may affect overall performance. A seminar
proposition of Anthony and Govindarajan
(1998) that there is a linear relationship
between performance and diversification
seems to be obsolete. Recent researches
found a non-linear prediction between
diversification and performance. For ins-
tance, Palich et al. (2000) found that as
related diversification may share some com-
mon core competencies between their
business units, they may create the mutual
operational synergies by creating a business
portfolio that is mutually beneficial Howe-
ver, when the relationship reaches its peak
as soon as there is no sharing of core compe-
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tencies between business units, the relation-
ship turns to negative.
An alternative model (so called inter-
mediate model) suggests that both related
and unrelated diversified firms have the
equal effect to the performance (Markides &
Williamson, 1994). It means, therefore, diver
sification leads to increase on performance
but it will go flat to the extent when there is
no synergy among business units. These
ambiguities occur perhaps due to a diverse,
independent measures used in operationa-
lizing diversification.
For instance, researches on corporate
strategy (i.e. decision to embark on diver-
sification, merger or acquisition decided by
the corporate level) have changed into the
use of more robust, financial data that can be
used to precisely measure the extent of
‘relatedness’ (Li & Greenwood, 2004).  Ho-
wever, management accounting-based re-
search, particularly on the budgetary-based
researches usually simply relies on the
number of entities to measure the extent of
diversification (e.g. Stede, 2001; Merchant,
1985). Due to its ease of use, this method is
widely acceptable in management accoun-
ting area.
Based on literature review above, diver-
sification is conceptualized as the corporate
strategy in which a firm active in distinct
businesses through firms’ institutional
investment. This conceptualization howe-
ver, does not differentiate the nature of
relatedness in the diversification as it is
barely possible, as also been argued by Stede
(2001), for this type of study to make clear
distinction in the related vs unrelated
diversification.
The Effect of Diversification on Budgetary
Slack
Simply stated, diversification can be
identified as the extent to which the
corporate can be concurrently active in two
or more businesses, either related or
unrelated.  Palich et al. (2000) suggested that
more diversified firms can employ a number
of mechanisms to create and exploit market
power advantages, tools that are unavailable
to their more focused counterparts. Losses in
the organization can be offset by the gains
from other business units. Diversified firms
can also attract for external funding for
expansion and shift other critical resources
for the sake of goal congruence from one
business units to another, and thus gene-
rating efficiencies that are unavailable to the
single-business firms (Palich et al. 2000).
Budgetary slack has been conceptua-
lized under many diverse terms. For ins-
tance, Douglas et al. (2007) defined budge-
tary slack as the difference between planned
performance targets (e.g. budgeted spen-
ding) and actual firm performance (e.g.
actual spending). Douglas and Wier (2000)
claimed that budgetary biasing behavior is
the difference between planned performance
target and real performance capabilities.
Yuen (2004) conceptualized budgetary slack
as the extent of resources above the mini-
mum required capicity attached into a
budget. Douglas et al. (2007) expanded the
concept in which they viewed budgetary
slack as an ethical issue. They argued that
when employees misrepresent their capa-
bilities, they are using their superior know-
ledge to unfair advantage. The resource
misallocation that results is dangerous for
both organizations and their shareholders.
Diversification may have some positive
impact to the presence of budgetary slack
for several reasons. Firstly,corporate parent
in the highly diversified state may be
unfamiliar with the business units opera-
tions, and thus they are not in the favorable
position to uncover slack (Stede 2001).
Moreover, even if corporate can detect the
presence of slack in the business units
budget,they may tend to let the slack exist as
a strategy to reduce information processing
at the corporate parent. Therefore, it is
expected that:
H1 : More diversified firms will let the
budgetary slack exist in their business
unit.
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The Effect of Diversification on The
Incentive Schemes
In relation with the effect of diver-
sification on the incentive schemes, agency
theory can be used to explain the relation-
ship. The agency theory posits that agents
are purely self-interest, rational and risk
averse actors. The theory also argues that
principals can motivate agents by mani-
pulating their incentives schemes, with
some extent of controls. An agency dilemma
may occur, however, when a principal have
little ability to monitor or assess an agent’s
behavior. Furthermore, although slack is
inherently unobserved, but linking the incen
tives with the performance may reduce the
slack creation in the business units budget
as the incentives schemes can encourage the
business units managers actions in line with
the corporate objectives. Therefore, it is
suggested to use internal compensation
schemes to examine the agency relationships
in the organization context.
On the other hand, according to agency
theory, incentives should be optimum when
business unit managers respond to them.
Since the direct control from corporate
parent in the diversified firms may lower,
business unit managers in diversified firms
are likely to have discretion about more
aspects of their work, and hence, have
greater marginal impact on performance.
Agency theory suggests that formal moni-
toring of outcome-based performance and
incentives are complementary when corpo-
rate do not familiar with the operation of
distinct business (Stede 2001).
There is one dimension that consists of
three types on how incentive was deter-
mined: first, the extent to which the incen-
tive system that is based on total corporate
performance, second, the bonus and incen-
tive that is based on business unit perfor-
mance, and third, a combination of both
(hereafter formulae based incentive). The
extent of diversification may also affect each
type of incentive system determined by the
corporate. However, since apriori relation-
ships between diversification and incentives
schemes have not been previously establi-
shed, the second hypotheses are stated in
the null form:
H2a : Diversification does not affect the
business unit performance-induced
incentive systems.
H2b : Diversification does not affect the
corporate performance-induced incen-
tive systems.
H2c : Diversification does not affect the
formulae-based incentive systems.
Using the fundamental lemma of
agency theory, that is, the assumptions of
opportunistic and self-serving actors
(Ekanayake, 2004), corporate will emphasize
more on the total corporate performance-
based incentive. This study have also main-
tained that when a total goal congruence is
emphasized by the corporate, individual
and group (business units) rewards must be
based on the corporate performance such as
corporate profit. This option is more
emphasized in order to help corporate in
reducing opportunistic behavior of agents
by limiting the opportunities and incentives
for dysfunctional behavior and moral
hazzard. Particularly, this study expect that:
H2d : The effect diversification on corporate
performance-based incentive will be
higher than business units’performance
based incentive.
The Effect of Incentive Schemes on
Budgetary Slack
The old saying that “you can get any-
thing if you are willing to pay for it” is, in
part, true. Especially in a profit-oriented
society such as the business world, where
money and incentives can act as a compen-
sation for any discomforness and unpleasant
situation. By assuming that slack is “bad”, as
it reflects the inefficiency of the organi-
zations, incentives and bonueses may be one
of the most important accounting conrol to
incentives or reward has become the most
appropriate accounting control to stimulate
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the managers to reduce any disfunctional
behaviors that may arise.
Behavioral scientists  have long stated
that in order to achieve the company goals,
it is deemed as necessary to provide the
executives with appropriate incentive sche-
mes (e.g. Henri, 2010). Unfortunately,
compensation packages intended to moti-
vate executives sometimes do fail. Several
reasons that can be blamed for the mis-
congruence of goals are due to the flaws in
the design of compensation systems and
poor admnistration of rewards.
Reid (2002) maintained that budgetary
slack is affected by the incentive systems
because incentives may provide pressures to
the business units managers and thus they
may not have much incentives to create
budgetary slack. The formulae-based incen-
tives (at the corporate or business units
level) may eliminate the subjectivity and
performance fluctuations that are caused by
other business units.
It is interesting therefore, to examine
the hypothesis on whether budgetary slack
is influenced by the extent, and the type of
incentive schemes. Thus, this study pro-
poses, that:
H3a : Higher corporate performance-based
incentive system reduces the presence
of budgetary slack in the business
units.
H3b : Higher business unit performance-
based incentive system reduces the
presence of budgetary slack in the
business units.
H3c : The combination of both incentives
reduces the likelihood of biasing the
budget target (budgetary slack) by
business unit’s managers.
These hypotheses may not identify
what kind of incentive schemes that contri-
bute most in reducing the budgetary slack.
Use of “so-called quantitative” formulae
that combined the corporate and business
units incentives may reduce both the depen-
dence of performance of other business units
as well as alignment with the firm’s goal
conruance. Thus, in accordance with H2d
above, This study propose that corporate
perfor- mance-based incentive will eliminate
the propensity of opportunistic behavior of
managers by creating slack. Besides, putting
more emphasis on formulae-based incentive
makes total corporate goal congruence
attainable and reduces the conflicts between
business unit managers. Therefore,
H3d : The relationship between incentive
and budgetary slack will be higher if
incentive is tied to the total (formulae-
based) corporate performance, rather
than other incentives.
Figure 1
Hypotheses Model
Diversification
Business Unit performance-
based incentive (1)
Corporate based
performance-incentive (2)
Formulae-based incentive
(1&2)
Budgetary
Slack
Manager’s VOI
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The Effect of VOI on The Relationship
Between Diversification and Budgetary
Slack.
Current study proposes that a nega-
tive and weaker relationship exist between
diversified firms and budgetary slack with
higher value orientation towards innovation
(VOI) than for firms with low VOI for the
following two reasons: First, firms with high
VOI tend to have higher uncertainty in their
environment because they seek to innovate
and create new ideas and projects. These
kind of activities may reduce the predic-
tability of income and returns. As the
perceived level of uncertainty in the firms
with high VOI tends to be high
(Subramaniam and Mia, 2001), they would
prefer higher autonomy in decision making
because such autonomy will provide them
greater flexibility to hedge against un-
foreseen contingencies in the future. Since
the uncertainty is eliminated (or at least,
reduced) then budgetary slack may also be
decreased as slack creation is a way to hedge
against unforeseen contingencies in the
future.
Second, a company with more diver-
sified firms will endanger the development
of creative ideas and new projects. On the
contrary, in less diversified ones, managers
may insist that promising new, bright ideas
can be scrutinized by top management. If
performance is measured by how-good
managers achieve the budget target, than
they will set the target easier than his/her
real capability. Therefore, This study expect
that:
H4 : A negative and weaker relationship
exist between diversified firms and
budgetary slack with high VOI than for
firms with low VOI.
RESEARCH METHOD
Variables Measurement
Diversification
To measure the corporate diversifi-
cation, This study used the number of
separate entities in each company (entity) as
a proxy for the degree of diversification at
the highest organizational level. Each busi-
ness units must be one of two or more
subsidiaries from a publicly trade manu-
facturing corporate with a 51% ownership.
Incentives Schemes
As previously stated, this study ana-
lyzed three schemes of incentive system
(corporate performance, business unit perfor
mance incentive systems and a combination
of both (formulae based incentive)). Cor-
porate performance based incentives was
measured by simply asking the percentage
of incentive that the corporate received that
was based on total corporate performance.
While business unit performance based
incentives was measured by the percentage
of bonus/incentive that was based on the
business unit performance. Finally, This
study calculate the proportion of corporate
vs business unit performance by using arith-
metic average for two kinds of incentive
systems (henceforth, formulae based incen-
tive system).
Budgetary slack
Budgetary slack was assessed by mana-
gers’ likelihood to set their budget target
lower than their real performance capability
in the future so that the budget becomes
easier to achieve. This variable was mea-
sured by Stede’s (2000; 2001) measurement
that consists of 5 items. Examples of
questions are “succeed to submit the bud-
gets that are easily attainable” and “budget
target have not caused me to be particularly
concerned with improving efficiency in my
business units”. Answers to all statements
(except item no 5) are based on the follo-
wing rating scale: 1 (strongly disagree), 2
(disagree), 3 (neutral), 4 (agree) and 5
(strongly agree).
Value Orientation towards Innovation
The construct was measured using a six
item instrument, which was adapted from
Subramaniam and Mia (2001). Respondents
were asked to indicate the extent to which
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members of the organizations value the
concept of innovation under each item in the
instrument on a five point-scale ranging
from 1 (not at all) to 5 (to a very great
extent). They asked to indicate the values of
innovation, opportunities, experimenting,
risk-taking, being careful (reverse-coded),
and rules-orientation (reverse-coded).
Sample
Pilot study was conducted to 34 respon-
dents that represented the sample of this
study to ensure the feasibility and clarity of
questionnaires and collected comments from
them. After evaluated the results of pilot
and made some minor revisions, 505 final
questionnaires were mailed and 100 questi-
onnaires were e-mailed to the manufactu-
ring subsidiaries of manufacturing go public
firms that were listed on their 2002’s annual
reports. However, it found very low res-
ponse rate in the first stage of study; totally
43 responses for mailed questionnaires and
2 for e-mailed ones. The second stage of data
gathering was conducted and allocated to
the 200 respondents. This study, though,
found 56 usable responses (28 percent res-
ponse rate), but the strict requirement was
loosened; subsidiaries with go public cor-
porate were not required; both subsidiaries
from publicly or non publicly manu-
facturing corporate could be included as the
sample. Nevertheless, each parent must
have two subsidiaries minimum with com-
mon stock ownership more than 51%. Total
usable responses in the full scale study were
101 which were accounted for 12.5 per cent
(101 out of 805). Variance responses of these
two different sets of data did not differ
significantly based on Lavene’s test for
equality of variances (except for incentive
schemes that differs significantly on 5%
significance level). Non response bias test
also found no significant differences bet-
ween the late and early responses at 10%
significance level.
The main activity of respondents were
food and beverages, textile and mill pro-
ducts, lumber and wood products, plastics
and glass products, metal and allied pro-
ducts, pharmaceuticals, and consumer
goods (displayed in table 1).
Table 1
Distribution of Respondents by Activity Sectors
Activity sectors Respondents Percents
Food and beverages 33 32.67
Textile mill products 20 19.80
Plastic and glass products 23 22.77
Metal and allied products 14 13.86
Consumer goods 11 10.90
Total 101 100
Method of Analysis
The structural model was set up in
LISREL 8.54. It is clearly stated that there are
four observed variables (diversification and
three schemes of incentive systems) and two
constructs (budgetary slack and VOI) (Fuad
and Sabeni, 2005). Nevertheless, budgetary
slack and VOI were treated as the observed
variables by an average scale. At least there
are two reasons in using the manifest
(observed) variables and not as latent with
multiple indicators for budgetary slack and
VOI constructs. First, the number of esti-
mated parameters will be reduced signi-
ficantly (thus reducing the model’s degrees
of freedom), in order to find the best fit of
the model. Second, budgetary slack was
measured by 5 point Likert-typed scale data
and can be categorized as ordinal data
(Joreskog and Sorbom, 1993a). The variables
with the ordinal data have no metric, means,
variances and covariances are not meaning-
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ful. As a consequence, subsequent analysis
using SEM may result in biased estimates
(Joreskog and Sorbom, 1993a; Byrne, 1998).
Averaging the indicators will transform the
ordinal data into continuous ones and
eliminate the possibility of bias results.
This study employed moderated structu-
ral equation approach that was developed by
Ping (1996) set up in LISREL. Nevertheless,
because of the interrelatedness of the inter-
action term in MSEM analysis, it is quite
possible for the degrees of freedom in the
model to drop below +1 (Ghozali, and Fuad,
2005). For example, the interaction term
(VOI * Diversification) may load on VOI or
Diversification; thus the interaction term
may correlated with VOI and Diversifi-
cation. This will cause multicollinearity pro-
blem in SEM (Fuad and Ghozali, 2005).
One strategy for minimizing these pro-
blems is to begin the analysis by centering
all the observed variables as suggested by
Cortina et al. (2001). In multivariate analysis,
the use of mean-centered data (i.e. variables
whose raw values have been replaced by
deviation scores) removes nonessential ill
conditioning; that is, centering variables
prior to formation of interaction product
minimizes the relationships between the
variables and the product created from
them.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
The correlations, as displayed below the
diagonal in table 2, suggest that diver-
sification (as measured by the number of
entities), is positively associated with budge-
tary slack. This indicates that as the number
of entities controlled by corporate increases,
than this also leads to increasing the mana-
ger’s tendency to create budgetary slack.
However, more diversified firms did not
correlate with three different schemes of
incentive.  Three schemes of incentive sys-
tems, not surprisingly, correlated between
one and another (Sohn, 2000).
Various measures of fit can be used to
evaluate the fit between structural model
equations and the data. Brief descriptions of
the measures cited in table 3 are given here.
The likelihood-ratio chi square measure of
fit should be nonsignificant, demonstrating
that there is no significant discrepancy bet-
ween the observed and the predicted cova-
riance matrices (Ghozali and Fuad, 2005).
The ECVI (Expected Cross-Validation In-
dex), the AIC (Akaike Information Crite-
rion), and the CAIC (Corrected Akaike Infor
mation Criterion) compare models on the
basis of criteria that take parsimony (the
number of parameters) into account as well
as fit. For these three indices, the model with
the smallest value is considered to have the
best fit. The GFI (Goodness of Fit Index)
does not depend on sample size and
measures how much better the model fits as
compared to no model at all. This index
should be 0.90 or higher for an adequate
model. The NFI (Normed Fit Index), the CFI
(Comparative Fit Index) and the IFI (Incre-
mental Fit Index) measure how much better
the model fits compared to a baseline model,
but also take parsimony into account
(Westwood and Low, 2003).
One should keep in mind that no index
is superior to others (Ghozali and Fuad,
2005). Instead, all fit indices must be consi-
dered simultaneously and not make a “dul-
led”-final conclusion based on one (or two)
fit index. The results above suggested that
model A is the best model of all others, and
model C is better than model B. Although χ2
is not significant on model B indicates that
model does not fit with the data, but other
fit measures range from reasonable until
superior fit. Besides, the χ2 is sensitive and
often results the poor model when the
samples are large.
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Table 2
Correlation and Covariances Matrices and Standard Deviation
Divrst Inccomb Incunit Inccor Slack Voi Modvoi
Divrst 26.428 0.042 0.030 0.055 1.858 0.331 12.883
Inccomb 0.110 0.006 0.006 0.005 -0.011 -0.007 0.062
Incunit 0.064 0.860** 0.008 0.003 -0.012 -0.011 0.074
Inccor 0.125 0.843** 0.451** 0.007 -0.010 -0.003 0.354
Slack 0.384** -0.158 -0.141 -0.128 0.886 0.105 -1.146
Voi 0.094 -0.141 -0.183 -0.053 0.164 0.466 -0.213
Modvoi 0.608** 0.201* 0.199* 0.173 -0.295** -0.076 17.016
Std.Dev. 5.141 0.075 0.090 0.086 0.941 0.683 4.125
Correlations, in italics, below the diagonal, level of significance: **(p < 0.01),*(p < 0.05)
Covariances were displayed above the diagonal; variances was marked with bold-typed
Table 3
Goodness of Model Fit Based on Three Different Schemes of Incentive Systems
Index Model A
Corporate-based
Model B
Business unit-based
Model C
Formulae-based
χ2, (df), p 1.44, (2), 0.49 6.83, (2), 0.033 4.60, (2),  0.10
RMSEA 0.0 0.15 0.11
ECVI 0.29 0.34 0.31
AIC 27.43 32.61 30.49
CAIC 74.42 79.60 77.49
GFI 0.99 0.97 0.98
NFI 0.98 0.91 0.94
CFI 1.00 0.92 0.96
IFI 1.01 0.93 0.96
AGFI 0.96 0.81 0.87
Table 4
Multivariate Structural Equation Models
MODEL A
Corporate based
MODEL B
Business Unit-based
MODEL C
Formulae-based
Path
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
DIVRST INCNTV 0.018 1.81** 0.0011 0.63 0.0016 1.09
INCNTVSLACK 0.12 0.12 -0.32 -0.47 -1.13 -1.39
DIVRSTSLACK 0.16 10.55* 0.16 10.67* 0.16 10.76*
VOISLACK 0.015 0.16 0.016 0.18 0.0070 0.078
MODVOISLACK -0.19 -10.19* -0.19 -9.97* -0.19 -9.93*
* path is significant at 0.01 level
**path is significant at 0.1 level
Table 4 supports H1, H2b, H2d, H3d and
H4 at conventional levels of significance. No
significant relationships can be established
in other relationships. Diversified corporate
parents seem to have more slack in their
business unit budgets (H1). Diversified
parents also provide more incentive for their
business managers based on the total
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corporate performance (H2b). Since only one
hypothesis that is significant with respect to
the effect of diversification on incentive
schemes, and the significant result deals
with total corporate performance; thus H2d
is accepted.
It is interesting to find out that what-
ever incentive schemes offered to the busi-
ness unit’s managers, they can not reduce
the likelihood of managers to biasing the
budget target (H3a, H3b, H3c). Thus, H3d, the
relationship between incentive and budge-
tary slack will be higher if incentive is tied to
the total corporate performance, rather than
other incentives, is also rejected. With res-
pect to the moderating effect of manager’s
value orientation towards innovation in the
relationship between diversification and
budgetary slack is also exist. This is shown
by the significant effect of the product
variable (MODVOI = DIVRST*VOI) to the
budgetary slack (H4).
Further advanced results are displayed
in table 5 informing the effect composition
of the variables hypothesized. Nevertheless,
there are no surprising differences with
results previously stated.
Discussion
This study reveals that diversification
positively affects  the budgetary slack. The
result can be explained by the monitoring
problem in the corporate level. Since corpo-
rate managers are more unlikely to be inti-
mately familiar with the various activities of
the business units, than detecting budgetary
slack in the business units are difficult.
Besides, following Galbraith model, the pre-
sence of budgetary slack is just a conscious
strategy of the corporate to reduce infor-
mation processing at the top. More budge-
tary slack reduces the chance of missing the
budget target, and therefore less dispersions
that need to be scrutinized (Yen and Andre,
2007).
Moreover, the results also suggest that
more diversified parents tend to give more
incentive to their subsidiaries. However, the
incentive to the business unit’s managers is
tied to the total corporate performance
rather than individual business unit perfor-
mance alone. This result conflicts with the
hypothesis, in which tying a business unit
managers’ bonus to corporate performance
may be counter-productive because it makes
the bonus dependent on things out- side the
control of business unit managers.
The logical reasoning for this pheno-
menon is because the reliance on budgetary
performance measure is placed on the total
corporate budget, and not on business unit
performance (Cadez and Guilding, 2008).
Table 5
Indirect and Total Effects of Multivariate Structural Models
Indirect Total Effects
Divrst Divrst VOI Modvoi Incntv
Model A
Incntv 0.02(1.81)**
Slack 0.00(0.87) 0.16(10.77)* 0.01(0.16) -0.19(-10.19)* 0.12(1.00)
Model B
Incntv 0.00(0.63)
Slack 0.00(-0.38) 0.16(10.65)* 0.02(0.18) -0.19(-9.97)* -0.32(-0.47)
Model C
Incntv 0.00(1.09)
Slack 0.00(-0.86) 0.16(10.62)* 0.01(0.08) -0.19(-9.93)* -1.13(-1.39)
* path is significant at 0.01 level
** path is significant at 0.1 level
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Thus manager’s action will be depen-
dent on other business unit performance.
Therefore, making the business unit more
“superior” than others is not beneficial and
seem to prioritizing the business units’ goal
congruance. Further, the sample of this
study is dominated by the related diver-
sification. Since the success of diversifi-
cation is determined by how well each
business units share their core competencies
to other business units, than the corporate
will perceive that tying the incentive to the
business unit performance will make one(s)
business unit performs good while others
look poor.
Nevertheless, this incentive does not
reduce the propensity of manager’s to create
budgetary slack in their business units, as
shown by nonsignificant effect of incentive
schemes on budgetary slack. At least there
are two plausible explanations why compen
sation packages intended to motivate exe-
cutives frequently fail. One of the main
reasons is the lack of proper compensation
schemes and incentives admnistration
(Reid, 2002). It has been argued by
“classical” researchers that certain, uniqe
conditions must be taken into account when
designing such a system. For example,
overall performance is may be more effec-
tive when the incentives systems is desig-
ned, among others, to include the balance of
long term and short-term goals and acknow
ledge ones who take more risk.
Second, the stewardship relationship
between principal and stewards may pro-
vide reasonable explanation why high incen
tive systems do not reduce manager’s
tendency to create budgetary slack. Since
the sample of this study was mainly from
higher-order level of management, than
agency theory may not work well. Thus, the
corporate may put more emphasis on higher
order needs such as growth, achievement
and self-actualization rather than lower
order needs (e.g. incentive systems) to put
the manager’s interest in line with the
corporate needs (Stede, 2001). Incentive, in
this vein, may not act as a motivational
driver for their manager to act in the best
interest of the corporate but rather as the
“lipstick’s” administrative control.
As expected, it is also found that value
orientation towards innovation moderates
the relationship between diversification on
the presence of budgetary slack. In a more
diversified firms, managers are provided
with greater decision making autonomy for
planning and control and operating their
business as they are separated company
from their corporate. Given that firms’ with
high VOI are highly dependent upon the
degree of novelty or innovativeness in new
ideas, products or projects, the value of
innovation may affect the management con-
trol systems. Diversified firms on the other
hand may act as a catalyst to create in these
new ideas and to engage in more risk taking
activities. Thus, the interaction between
diversification and high (low) VOI is a
perfect fit to reduce (enhance) the presence
of budgetary slack in their business units
(Subramaniam and Mia, 2001).
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION
The main aim of this study is to analyze
in detail the effect of antecedent and con-
sequence of three different incentive sche-
mes; corporate-based, business unit-based
and formulae based incentive systems. This
study can be concluded that agency perspec
tives may no longer be suitable to explain
the presence of budgetary slack in their
business units as the nonsignificant effect
found on the relationship between incentive
schemes on budgetary slack. Instead, ste-
wardship perspective, grounded on the
view of manager’s motivational drivers,
may provide a more reasonable argument
why budgetary slack exist on the first place.
On the other hand, high firms’ VOI will
reduce the presence of budgetary slack if,
and only if, they exist in the diversified
subsidiaries.
This study inherently has several
limitations. First, incentive’s total variances
explained (R2) is very low, ranging from
0.02 until 0.21 (not shown). This means that
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approximately 79 percent until 99.98 percent
of incentive systems can be explained by
factors except diversification. Incentive sys-
tems and budgetary slack may actually be
influenced by other variables than those
considered in this study. Therefore, conclu-
sions can only be made with respect to the
variables hypothesized. Second, the low
response rate, 12.5 percent produce question
arose as to whether the responses obtained
were representative of the population. Ef-
forts, although limited, have been conduc-
ted to minimize the destructive effects to the
study’s findings by conducting non-res-
ponse bias test and Lavene’s test for equa-
lity of variances between publicly and non-
publicly traded companies.
This study suggest interested resear-
cher to use other measures of incentives
such as group-based vs tournament-based
incentive Inte- rested researchers may
incorporate reliance on accounting perfor-
mance measures to examine the indirect
effect of diversification on budgetary slack
to provide more compre hensive relation-
ships between firm’s situational factor and
administrative system on budgetary slack.
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